We present a simple to implement and efficient pseudorandom generator based on the factoring assumption. It outputs more than pn/2 pseudorandom bits per p exponentiations, each with the same base and an exponent shorter than n/2 bits. Our generator is based on results by Håstad, Schrift and Shamir [HSS93], but unlike their generator and its improvement by Goldreich and Rosen [GR00], it does not use hashing or extractors, and is thus simpler and somewhat more efficient.
Introduction

Background
Blum and Micali [BM84] and Yao [Yao82] introduced the notion of a pseudorandom generator secure against all polynomial-time adversaries. Since then, multiple constructions have been proposed. We do not survey them all here; rather, we focus on the ones that are of particular relevance to our work.
Almost all of the proposed constructions (starting with discrete-logarithm-based one of [BM84] ) consisted of repeatedly applying some one-way function and outputting its hardcore bits. The first generator based on the factoring assumption was proposed by Blum, Blum and Shub [BBS86] . It iterated modular squaring with an n-bit modulus, extracted one bit of output per iteration, and was originally proven secure based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. This was later improved by [ACGS88] , who showed that that only the factoring assumption is needed and that O(log n) bits could be extracted per iteration.
Håstad, Schrift and Shamir [HSS93] demonstrated that discrete logarithm modulo a product of two primes hides n/2 + O(log n) bits, based only on the factoring assumption. They suggested how to construct a pseudorandom generator based on this result by repeatedly exponentiating a fixed base g to an n-bit exponent; however, their construction required the use of hash function families to obtain uniformly pseudorandom bits (because the result of modular exponentiation could not be used in the next iteration of the generator, as it was not indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed n-bit string, nor from a uniformly distributed value in Z N ). This resulted in a loss of Θ(log 2 n) bits per iteration, thus giving a generator that output n/2 − Θ(log 2 n) pseudorandom bits per fixed-base modular exponentiation and one hashing. Note that having the same base for each modular exponentiation is important, because it allows for precomputation (as further described in Section 4).
Goldreich and Rosen [GR00] further improved this generator by demonstrating, in particular, that one can use exponents of length n/2 instead of full-length exponents. However, families of hash functions (or, rather, extractors) were still necessary, thus resulting in a loss of efficiency of each iteration, and the number of bits obtained. Namely, their generator obtains n/2 − O(log 2 n) pseudorandom bits per a fixed-base modular exponentiation (with half-length exponent) and one application of extractor.
Our Contributions
We improve the pseudorandom generators of [HSS93] and [GR00] by removing the need for hashing or extractors. Thus, our generator obtains n/2 + O(log n) bits of randomness per half of a fixed-base modular exponentiation (to be precise, our exponent is n/2 − O(log n) bits long). The resulting construction is thus simpler and faster than the ones of [HSS93] and [GR00] .
Our generator is quite similar to the one of Gennaro [Gen00] : it also essentially repeatedly raises a fixed base to a short exponent, outputs some bits of the result, and uses the rest as an exponent for the next iteration. The main difference is that Gennaro's generator, while more efficient than ours, works modulo a prime and requires the nonstandard assumption that discrete logarithms with short exponents are hard. Our generator, on the other hand, requires only the assumption that factoring products of safe primes is hard. As explained later in the text, that is a trivial consequence of the standard factoring assumption, if safe primes are frequent. Gennaro's generator also requires the assumption that safe primes are frequent.
We present a more general technique, which abstracts and clarifies the analysis of our generator and those of [Gen00, GR00] . The technique is a modification of the Blum-Micali paradigm [BM84] for constructing pseudorandom generators by iterating a one-way permutation and outputting hardcore bits. We observe that, whenever the one-way permutation's hardcore bits are a substring of its input 1 (as is the case for most natural one-way permutations), then the pseudorandom generator construction can be modified so that a substring of the input to the one-way permutation remains fixed in all iterations. This can potentially improve efficiency through precomputation. This general technique already yields most of the efficiency gains in our generator and those of [Gen00, GR00] , and also applies to other pseudorandom generators (such as [BBS86] ). In particular, it explains how Gennaro's generator is obtained from Patel's and Sundaram's [PS98] , providing a simpler proof than the one in [Gen00] .
An Efficient Pseudorandom Generator
Let:
• |x| denote the length of a string x, and x i denote the i-th bit of x;
• P, Q of equal length be safe primes (P = 2P + 1, Q = 2Q + 1, P and Q are prime);
• N = P Q and g be a random element of the group QR N of quadratic residues mod N ; log 2 N = n;
• s, s / ∈ QR N be two quadratic non-residues, such that J N (s) = 1 and J N (s) = −1;
• p(·) be a polynomial.
Construction 1.
On an input y ∈ Z N , this generator outputs m pseudorandom bits per one modular exponentiation with a c-bit exponent. Construction 1 can be optimized, because it uses the same fixed base g in every iteration. Thus, we can precompute some powers of g to speed up exponentiation. Contrary to popular belief, the "naive" precomputation strategy of computing g, g 2 , g 4 , g 8 , . . . , g 2 c−2 is not very good (it would require roughly (c − 2)/2 multiplications per iteration). It is better to use the technique of Lim and Lee [LL94] . As a simple example, consider precomputing just three values: g, g 2 (c−2)/2 , and their product. Then one can perform the square-and-multiply algorithm "in parallel," looking simultaneously at two positions of the bit string that represents the exponent: i and i + (c − 2)/2. This would result in an algorithm that takes (c − 2)/2 squarings and fewer than (c − 2)/2 multiplications. Generalizing this idea, we precompute the values g, g 2 a , g 2 2a , g 2 3a , . . . , g 2 c−2−a for some a (e.g., a = (c − 2)/2 or a = (c − 2)/4), as well as the products of all subsets of these values. Then we can perform the square-andmultiply algorithm "in parallel" by looking at (c − 2)/a positions in the exponent at once, thus obtaining an algorithm that takes (c − 2)/a squarings and multiplications. In particular, this algorithm would outperform the naive precomputation strategy when a = (c − 2)/4, while precomputing just 15 values instead of c − 2. In fact, if one has space to precompute c − 2 values, then this algorithm will require just (c − 2)/ log(c − 2) multiplications and squarings. Finally, it should be noted that this technique can also be used to speed up the pseudorandom generators given in [GR00] , [HSS93] and [Gen00] .
A further small optimization is possible if we choose P to be 3 modulo 8, and Q to be 7 modulo 8 (N is then called a Williams integer). In that case we can fix s = −1 and s = 2, because −1, 2 / ∈ QR N and J N (−1) = −1, J N (2) = 1. The last line of the generator then becomes:
In Section 4, we prove that Construction 1 indeed is a pseudorandom generator, using the techniques from Section 3, under the following assumption:
The first assumption is that products of safe primes are hard to factor: Assumption 2. Let N n denote the set of all n-bit products of equally sized safe primes:
Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. There is no constant c > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n:
To clarify the relation of the previous assumption, and the standard factoring assumption, let us take a look at: Clearly, Assumption 2 follows from the standard factoring assumption and Assumption 3. However, in the rest of the paper, we will use Assumption 2 specifically, because it is possible that it holds independently of Assumption 3.
General Construction and Proof Technique
In this section, we describe a general technique that we use to prove the pseudorandomness of the generator given in Construction 1. This general technique can also be used to speed up other pseudorandom generators, because it allows one to keep some bits of the seed the same in every iteration, thus permitting precomputation. In particular, we demonstrate that it is possible to keep the bits at hardcore positions intact, throughout the execution of the generator. This technique can be used to prove pseudorandomness of Gennaro's generator from [Gen00] (see Section A).
Background
We recall without proof two well-known facts (see, e.g. [Gol01] ). The first one says that oneway permutations plus hard-core bits give one a PRG with fixed expansion. The second one says that from a PRG with fixed expansion one can obtain a PRG with arbitrary (polynomial) expansion by iterating: dropping some bits of the output and using the remaining ones as a seed for the next iteration.
Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a one-way permutation and H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be hardcore for f . Let • denote concatenation of strings.
is a pseudorandom generator with an n-bit seed x.
, where p is a polynomial, be the following algorithm with an n-bit input x 0 :
Traditionally (e.g., [BM84, Yao82] ), the Lemmata 4 and 5 are combined in the following well-known construction.
Construction 6.
The following summarizes this section: 
New General Constructions
There is no reason that the above two theorems have to be combined specifically as in Construction 6. Below we propose an alternative way to combine them.
Let: • U S denotes the uniform distribution on set S
and G 1 provided by Lemma 4 as G 1 (
e., we simply split the (n + m)-bit output of G 1 into two strings, x i+1 and h i , and further split x i+1 into two strings h i+1 and r i+1 ):
Clearly, since G 1 is a PRG, so is G 1 (because if the output G 1 could be distinguished from uniform, then so could G 1 , by applying the appropriate bijections and swapping strings h i and h i+1 ). Applying Lemma 5 to G 1 , we get the following PRG G with an n-bit seed
Construction 8.
Visually,
The potential benefit of this construction is that part of the input to f (namely, h 0 ) remains the same for every iteration. For many f (such as the one in the next section) this results in increased efficiency, because some precomputation is possible.
Suppose further (in addition to everything assumed in Construction 8) that there exists an efficient algorithm R, that, given f ([h, r]) and h, computes f ([0 m , r]) (for any h, r), and
Then by applying Lemma 5 to G 1 , we get the following PRG G with an (n − m)-bit seed r 0 : Construction 9.
This construction has the further benefit that the fixed part of the input to f is always 0 m (rather than a random value h 0 ). Thus, even more precomputation may be possible (as shown in the next section). Moreover, the seed for this construction is only n − m, rather than n, bits long.
The summary of this section is given in the following: 
] ↔ x, such that H([h, r]) = h. Then Construction 8 is a pseudorandom generator.
Lemma 11. Let (in addition to the conditions stated in Lemma 10) there exist an efficient algorithm R, that, given f ([h, r]) and h, computes f ([0 m , r]) for any h, r. Let R(U
Then, Construction 9 is a pseudorandom generator.
Generalizing to other distributions
It is not necessary to restrict Lemmata 4 and 5 only to binary strings. Indeed, we can slightly generalize the notion of a pseudorandom generator to allow domains and ranges other than just {0, 1} k .
Definition 12. Let D and R be two efficiently samplable sets of binary strings. A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A is called a (D → R)-pseudorandom generator if it holds that A(U
D ) is indistinguishable from U R .
Given this definition, we can reformulate Lemmata 4 and 5 as follows. Let D, R ⊂ {0, 1}
n be efficiently samplable and let f : D → R be a bijection. Let H : D → {0, 1} m be hardcore for f .
Suppose further that f is a permutation of D.
pseudorandom generator can be obtained by iterating G 1 like in Lemma 5 (but with x i ∈ D).
Construction 8 can also be formulated in terms of more general sets. Namely, suppose that the uniform distribution on D can be decomposed into a direct product of two independent parts: uniform on hardcore bits, and the appropriate distribution on the rest. Then we can swap the hardcore bits as in Construction 8, because both h i and h i+1 are uniform and independent from r i+1 anyway. Of course, we do not need true uniformity and independence, but only enough to fool a polynomial-time adversary.
More precisely, let D ⊂ {0, 1} n be an efficiently samplable domain; let 
Lemma 15. If the uniform distribution
U D is indistinguishable from [U {0,1} m , V ], then G 1 is a ([U {0,1} m , V ] → [U {0,1} m , V ] × {0, 1} m )-pseudorandom generator,
and can be iterated as in Construction 8 to obtain a (D → {0, 1}
mp(n) )-pseudorandom generator.
Lemmata 10 and 11 (and consequently Constructions 8 and 9) can be reformulated for more general sets D, R, just like Construction 8.
Proof of Correctness of Our Generator
We use the idea described in Section 3 to prove that the algorithm given in Construction 1 is a (Z N → {0, 1} mp(n) )-pseudorandom generator, under Assumption 2. To be precise, Section 3 was written in terms of one-way functions, while Construction 1 first of all selects a one-way function from a family by picking N and g. Of course, the generic constructions of Section 3 still apply (with appropriate technical modifications), because Lemmata 4 and 5 still hold (see [Gol01] ).
Establishing a single iteration
We start by recalling Theorem 5 of [HSS93] . Let N be a random n-bit Blum integer, and let g be a random quadratic residue in Z * N . Note that this does not automatically give a pseudorandom generator suitable for iteration, because it is not of the form (D → D × {0, 1} m ). In [HSS93] , universal hash functions are used to achieve this.
Theorem 16 ([HSS93]). If Assumption 2 holds, then
However, by slightly modifying the function f (x) = g x , it is possible to obtain a simple pseudorandom generator that permits iteration. The intuitive idea is to try to make f a bijection of the entire Z N . To do so, we first make sure that g generates the entire QR N by picking N as a product of two safe primes: then a random g ∈ QR(N ) is overwhelmingly likely to generate QR N .
3 We then observe that QR N has 4 cosets: s·QR N , s·QR N , s·s·QR N and itself, QR N . So we can add another two bits to the domain of f , and use these bits to pick which coset we map to, thereby covering the whole Z * N . These modifications do not reduce the number of hardcore bits from Theorem 16.
The range of f is thus Z * N , which is very close to Z N . The domain is also very close to Z N : it is {0, 1, . . . , φ(N )/4 − 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, which is essentially the same as Z * N . Thus, even though our modified f is not a permutation of Z N , it is almost one.
m be defined as:
Let f : {0, 1, . . . ,
N be as follows:
Proof. The proof is by a simple reduction to Corollary 17. The details are straightforward and are given in Appendix B.
Now some care is needed to modify the generator F , so that it may be iterated, since its domain and range are not as required by the constructions of Section 3. What makes iteration possible is that there are efficiently computable "almost bijections" between {0, 1, . . . ,
− 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} and Z N , as well as between Z * N and Z N . Hence, we can use Z N as the domain and as the range of f , and that should not make significant difference. The following is merely a formalization of this statement:
m be as follows:
3 For N = P Q with safe P, Q, the subgroup QR N of quadratic residues in Z * N is of order φ(N )/4 = P Q and is cyclic. QR N is cyclic, because QR N ∼ = QR P × QR Q , and QR P and QR Q are cyclic of distinct prime orders P and Q , respectively. Hence, the order of almost any element of QR N is P Q , and therefore almost any element of QR N is a generator (unless it is 1 modulo P or Q). . . 1. We will prove the following:
m .
•
Iterating
By Theorem 14, F can be iterated to yield polynomial expansion: in each iteration, we output h(x), and use g xn...x 3 · s x 2 · s x 1 as the next input for F . Better yet we show that Construction 9 can be used to give a more efficient generator with polynomial expansion. There are two conditions that need to be satisfied for that: there has to be a pairing [·, ·] with properties described in Lemma 15, and F has to exhibit the self-reducibility property described in Construction 9.
In the following simple lemma, we define a pairing [·, ·] 
Next, we show that F is self-reducible in the sense of Construction 9. To do that, we only need to provide the reduction algorithm R. We define it simply as R(y, h) = y · g −h . Clearly, R is efficiently computable, R(U Z N × U m ) = U Z N , and a simple calculation verifies that R (F ([h, r] 
(F is the one-way function that we use to obtain F ).
Based on the observation about self-reducibility and Lemma 20, we can apply Construction 9 to F , thus obtaining the following pseudorandom generator: 
. By applying Construction 9 to f , we obtain exactly the generator given above. So we only need to demonstrate that the two conditions for Construction 9 are fulfilled.
Let us first define the pairing described in Lemma 15. Let 
